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CARL ABBOTT 
Five Downtown Strategies: Policy 
Discourse and Downtown Planning 
Since 1945 
Americans have planned for their downtowns within a continually 
changing framework of images and assumptions about the nature of 
central business districts. During each decade since World War II, discus~ 
sion of downtown problems and possibilities has been dominated by a 
distinct set of assumptions that has conditioned academic research, fed~ 
eral policy, and local planning. From decade to decade, experts on 
downtowns have chosen different themes as central to the interpretation 
of downtown growth, change, and policy needs. As the understanding of 
the situation has changed, so have the preferred planning solutions and 
public interventions. 
This argument about the importance of understanding the history of 
"downtown" as an intellectual construct can be contrasted with three 
major approaches that have dominated the analysis of downtown plan~ 
ning and policy in the United States over the last half century. 
A number of writers have analyzed downtown policy as an expression of 
interest~group or class politics. In this interpretation, downtown is one of 
several arenas in which different groups contest for control of urban land 
patterns. Most common, the battle for downtown is seen as a one~sided 
contest between the city's large corporations, banks, and land owners on 
one side and small businesses and low~income residents on the other. 
Influential examples include Clarence Stone's work on Atlanta, Arnold 
Hirsch's study of Chicago, Chester Hartman's work on San Francisco, and 
Chris Silver's history of Richmond. Gerald Suttles's recent examination 
of contemporary Chicago in The Man~Made City recycles the same ap~ 
pmach with sympathy for the goals of gentrification and land conversion 
rather than the more common concern with the social costs of downtown 
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redevelopment. A comparative analysis of six current downtown plans by 
Norman Krumholz and Dennis Keating implicitly places the documents in 
the context of group politics by testing their balance between economic 
development and social equity. 1 
Other analysts have adopted a structure~driven model in which down~ 
town development and redevelopment programs are seen as rational re~ 
sponses to specific socioeconomic circumstances and problems. A pure 
structural model is organized around a dynamic of challenge and response. 
Changes external to the policy system, such as new technologies, immigra~ 
tion, or the regional readjustment of economic activity, create problems 
that call forth policy solutions. In tum, altered circumstances may give 
rise to new problems that call forth new solutions. This model assumes 
that policies are logically situated between problems and programs, al~ 
though policies may have unintended as well as intended consequences. 2 
A detailed recent application of the structural approach is Jon Teaford's 
The Rough Road to Urban Renaissance, which examines revitalization pol~ 
icy in twelve northern cities and finds a series of partial successes that lead 
repeatedly to more complex problems. Teaford treats downtown planning 
and urban renewal as elements in comprehensive revitalization programs 
that have also included annexation, public housing, industrial develop~ 
ment, and transportation. He finds a broad shift from optimism to pessi~ 
mism and diminished expectations during the 1960s. Nevertheless, city 
leaders are seen as fighting gamely against a shifting set of problems, 
winning occasional battles but neither winning nor losing the larger war. 3 
A third approach follows a teleological model that traces the roots of 
present successes. Bernard Frieden and Lynne Sagalyn, for example, are 
modern equivalents of the Whig historians who celebrated the progress of 
liberty in the growth of the English Constitution. Their study, Downtown, 
Inc.: How America Rebuilds Its Cities, essentially follows a structural model 
written as the story of progress. A single clear problem is identified in the 
1940s and 1950s. Politicians and planners then work through trial and 
error toward an increasingly effective solution, moving from urban re~ 
newal to festival markets and downtown malls. There is room for detours 
but not for the blind alleys that Teaford describes. 4 
Without rejecting these three approaches to the history of downtown 
policy, this article offers a supplementary perspective. I believe that many 
scholars and planners have shared an underlying assumption that "down~ 
town" is a singular knowable entity-a basic category of urban analysis. In 
this common conception, academic and applied research presumably illu~ 
minate more and more aspects of this knowable entity, allowing the fine 
tuning of plans and policies. My emphasis, in contrast, is on "downtown" 
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as a constructed concept whose meaning or understanding has undergone 
surprisingly rapid changes. As the structural model argues, these mutable 
understandings have certainly been rooted in the changing social and 
economic structure of American cities, and they have certainly proved of 
varying use to different groups and interests. However, they have also had 
lives of their own as intellectual constructs, with the thematic understand~ 
ing of one decade defined in part as a reaction against earlier ideas. In 
tum, these ideas about downtowns can be seen as filtered reflections of 
broader trends in political thought or cultural expression. 
This article explores these changing ideas by examining the contents 
and assumptions of a variety of formal and informal texts. One obvious set 
of sources is academic and professional analysis of downtowns by geogra~ 
phers, planners, and real estate specialists. The discussion is also based on 
my understanding of implementation efforts and programs, from urban 
renewal to the pursuit of amenity projects. Situated between the analysis 
and the programs have been formal downtown plans and planning pro~ 
cesses that have tried to link theory and practice. Chronologically parallel 
shifts in content and emphasis among the three sorts of texts help to 
substantiate the assumption that public action about central business 
districts has been rooted in a partially autonomous realm of changing 
ideas. 
The shift from one thematic understanding to another has not been 
unidirectional. Downtown policy has been characterized by sharp disconti~ 
nuities and the repeated implementation of policies at right angles to 
those of the previous decade. The changing themes and recommended 
solutions can be summarized as a set of ideal types. No single city has 
exactly matched the sequence, and thematic elements from one policy era 
have carried over into the following decades. Nevertheless, the historian 
can define five successive themes and related policies. 
• 1945-55: The downtown as the unitary center of the American me~ 
tropolis required improved access through highway improvements and 
downtown ring roads. 
• 1955-65: Downtown understood as a failing real estate market ap~ 
peared to require the land assembly and clearance associated with the 
urban renewal program. 
• 1965-75: Downtown as a federation of subdistricts called for community 
conservation, historic preservation, and "human scale" planning. 
• 1975-85: Downtown as a set of individual experiences required regula~ 
tion of private design and public assistance for cultural facilities, retail 
markets, open space, and other amenities. 
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• 1985-: Viewed as a command post in the global economy, downtown 
has required planning for expanded office districts and supporting 
facilities. 
Downtown as the Unitary Center of the Metropolitan Area: 
1945-55 
Thinking about American downtowns during the first half of the twenti, 
eth century was shaped by the idea of the unified metropolitan commu, 
nity. Although the metropolitan area concept was developed in the early 
twentieth century, it gained broad popularity with the definition of the 
easily grasped Standard Metropolitan Area for the 1950 census. 5 The idea 
assumed the existence of a dominant central city, which was itself struc, 
tured around a downtown core. Academic analysis of downtowns there, 
fore operated within the framework of Ernest Burgess's zonal model and 
Homer Hoyt's sectoral model of urban land use, both of which posited 
that cities were organized around unitary centers. 6 
Building on work from the 1920s and 1930s, experts in the postwar 
decade analyzed land values to identify the precise center of central busi, 
ness districts (CBDs) and the gradient of real estate values away from that 
center. John Rannels utilized a detailed survey of central Philadelphia 
land uses to define the "center of gravity" and degree of dispersion of CBD 
activities. 7 Other researchers tried to define "downtown" as distinguished 
from its surrounding blocks of deteriorated or transitional uses. Raymond 
Murphy, James Vance, and Bart Epstein epitomized the research effort 
with an elaborate analytical definition of the downtown based on building 
heights and the percentage of total floor space on each block that was 
devoted to a carefully limited list of "central business uses." Their stan' 
dardized definition was intended to allow easy comparisons among down, 
town areas taken as units. 8 
Related studies of commuting and shopping patterns found that the 
golden age of the 1920s, when downtowns were the place to go, was alive 
and well after World War II. Gerald Breese found that total daytime 
population in downtown Chicago in 1946 matched the previous peak of 
1929. Sociologist Donald Foley documented a strong upward trend in the 
number of people entering the CBDs of small and mid,sized metropolitan 
areas between 1926 and 1950 and concluded that there was little sub, 
stance to the notion that suburban dispersion was undermining central 
business districts. 9 Most planning projections of downtown land,use needs 
assumed a straight, line continuation of past relationships between metro' 
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politan growth and size and the roles and size of the central business 
district. 10 
Business and marketing literature agreed on the strength of downtown 
as an office and retail center. C. T. Jonassen's analyses of shopper 
references in Columbus, Seattle, and Houston found that downtowns' 
held a significant edge over struggling suburban shopping centers. "The 
advantages now enjoyed by the central business district," he concluded, 
"are not easily alterable, for they are rooted in the ecological structure of 
American cities and in their cultural and social system." Downtowns, 
said J. D. Carroll, were the "only focus" and the "only sites" for essential 
urban activities. The sole requirement was successful treatment of traffic 
congestion and parking. II Whatever the changes in metropolitan areas, 
concluded the Central Business District Council of the Urban Land 
Institute in 1954, "downtown continues to hold its position as the gath~ 
ering place of America-the center of business and finance, the center 
of shopping on its most lavish scale, the center for theaters and for 
culture. "12 
The assumption that everyone still wanted to get downtown defined 
the logical focus of planning activity as the improvement of access and 
circulation. Downtown itself was taken as a given-as a unique and 
essential element within a metropolitan structure. The postwar develop~ 
ment plans that dozens of cities prepared in 1943, 1944, and 1945 offered 
broadly inclusive programs for capital investment with little special target~ 
ing for downtown. 13 The last generation of classic master plans during the 
1940s gave little explicit attention to the downtown itself as a special 
problem. Instead, the typical proposal was for the opening of new 
circumferential highways closely bordering the downtown, to improve 
access and set off surrounding residential areas. Also prominent were 
proposals for civic centers as metropolitan foci, a recycling of a key idea 
from the City Beautiful-era century that assumed the natural centering of 
the metropolis. 14 
Two points stand out in a set of major comprehensive plans prepared in 
the mid~ and late 1940s for Washington, D.C., Richmond, Dallas, and 
Cincinnati. 15 The first is that few of the planners considered the CBD to 
be seriously at risk. The plans tended to give greatest attention to hous~ 
ing, neighborhood identity, and neighborhood conservation. In turn, 
neighborhoods were to be linked together into a single metropolitan 
community by transportation improvements and by their common rela~ 
tion to the downtown. For example, Cincinnati's Metropolitan Master Plan 
of 1948 acknowledged the "close relationship between the Central Busi~ 
ness District and each community" but did not see the CBD itself as 
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requmng attention. The Dallas plan ran to fourteen volumes, none fo-
cused specifically on downtown. 16 
When downtown did need attention, the solution was improved access 
through peripheral freeways. Harlan Bartholomew wanted to use the 1946 
Master Plan for Richmond to promote the vision of a tightly centralized 
city, in part by expanding the central business district and tying it to 
neighborhoods by a set of highways and widened boulevards. As Chris 
Silver has noted, the new or improved roads would define the boundaries 
for an expanded business core. The result, said the document, would be 
"continued stability and protection of values within the central business 
district." Elsewhere in the South, Nashville cleared the back slopes of its 
Capitol Hill in 1954 to provide space for a park, parking lots, and the 
J ames Robertson Parkway to loop traffic around the back side of the CBO 
and across the Cumberland River on a new Victory Memorial Bridge. Ii 
The National Capital Park and Planning Commission offered a similar 
prescription in its 1950 plan for the Washington region. Its proposal for 
an inner highway loop drawing a one,mile circle around the White House 
and the retail,office core was the work of Harland Bartholomew in his role 
as chief consultant to the NCPPC. The idea was seconded by the influen-
tial Washington architect Louis Justement, who had made a similar pro-
posal in a 1946 book, New Cities for Old. It was supported as well by the 
transportation subcommittee of the Committee of 100, a local good 
planning/good government organization. IS 
Victor Gruen's highly publicized plan for downtown Fort Worth is a 
climax of thinking about a unitary downtown. An architect with experi-
ence in shopping center design, Gruen proposed a grand scheme to isolate 
the core of Fort Worth within a ring of six grand parking garages served by 
a highway loop. With its streets freed from automobiles, downtown Fort 
Worth could recapitulate the suburban shopping mall. Had Fort Worth 
acted on the plan, it would have given physical expression to Gruen's 
valuation of freeway loops and ring roads as "defense lines" and "fortifica-
tion systems" around the downtown. It would also have expressed his 
understanding of the "metropolitan core" as the "heart of the city. "19 
Downtown as a Failing Business Center: 1955-65 
In January 1955, J. Ross McKeever summarized the real estate trends of 
the past year for the readers of Urban Land, the trade journal of the real 
estate development industry. He left no doubt that downtown was "the 
functional heart of a metropolitan area" and the "focal point of commu-
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nity life." Two years later, Baltimore developer James Rouse told the same 
readership that downtowns were in serious trouble. They were physically 
obsolete and could not effectively reach the growing suburban market. 
Planners so far had dealt only with symptoms rather than sources of 
downtown problems. Only drastic action could assure the rebirth of the 
central business district. 20 
The contrast between the two views demonstrates the rapid emergence 
during the mid, 1950s of a new understanding of downtown as a declining 
activity center and failing real estate market. By the early 1960s, most 
Americans understood downtown as a district in crisis because of the 
relative or absolute decline of its attractiveness to shoppers, theatergoers, 
and service businesses. The 1958 Census of Business played an important 
role by documenting the shift of retailing and personal services to subur, 
ban locations. The 1960 Census of Population administered an additional 
shock by showing that many central cities had fallen far short of their 
expected populations. 21 With these "heralded indicators of decadence" as 
background, scholars analyzed the decline of downtown business in a 
group of studies that examined 1948-58 data and appeared in a cluster 
between 1960 and 1964. As in the previous decade, however, most of 
these studies continued to treat downtowns as economic units, comparing 
aggregated data on sales and employment. 22 
One local response was to organize a business group devoted specifically 
to upgrading the competitiveness of downtown. Unlike areawide cham, 
bers of commerce or the ubiquitous postwar planning committees of the 
1940s, these downtown groups battled for a share of the retail and service 
market rather than working for aggregate economic development. Exam, 
pIes can be found in Denver and Cincinnati, San Diego, Portland, and 
Richmond. The Committee for Downtown Baltimore grew out of the 
Retail Merchants Association in 1954. The Minneapolis Downtown 
Council appeared in 1955, the same year that the Indianapolis Civic 
Progress Association incorporated "to enhance the attractiveness and util, 
ity of the central downtown area." "Downtown in St. Louis, Inc." orga, 
nized in 1958 to engage in a "crusade" to renew downtown. 23 
The later 1950s and early 1960s also brought a round of focused down, 
town plans that worried explicitly about the future of the central business 
district. City planners now expressed the new understanding that down, 
town could easily lose its logical and organic predominance. Cleveland 
planners in 1959 worried that the future vitality of their downtown was 
threatened by suburbanization and blight as well as traffic. Dallas's revi, 
sion of Bartholomew's master plan included a separate report on the 
"Dallas Central District" (1961). Cincinnati's Central Business District 
,;,:' 
I 
I 
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Plan (1958), Central Business District and Riverfront Report (1961), and 
Plan for Downtown Cincinnati (1964) noted the shortfall of new private 
investment, proposed new zoning, and called for redevelopment of 
blighted land. 24 
As Cincinnatians and Clevelanders realized, the most obvious policy 
response to downtown business decline was urban renewal. Amendments 
in 1954 and 1959 transformed the Housing Act of 1949 into a downtown 
renewal program. Urban renewal advocates assumed that downtown 
could be made competitive by underwriting the real estate market and 
adding in public projects as attractors. The preferred target was un-
derutilized or "blighted" land just beyond the retail and office core. The 
nearly universal results were peripheral clearance projects and construc-
tion of public facilities. Renewal in cities such as New Haven, Pittsburgh, 
Philadelphia, and Washington was abundantly documented in newspa-
pers, magazines, and books such as Jeanne Lowe's Cities in a Race with 
Time (1967).25 The underlying impulse, as many critics were to point out, 
was to impose the universal rationalism of modern design on large seg-
ments of American downtowns. 
Academic research in the later 1950s supported the renewal strategy by 
emphasizing the distinction between an intensively used downtown core 
and a less intensively used "frame." The idea of a frame was a more limited 
restatement of the historic "zone in transition." Downtown frames were 
hodge-podge zones of warehouses, light industry, cheap housing, transpor-
tation terminals, auto dealers, and public institutions such as hospitals. 
The idea evolved in applied work in Seattle and Cincinnati and was 
elaborated in detail by Edgar Horwood and Ronald Boyce in 1959. 26 
Ernest Jurkat presented a similar concept with different terminology when 
he defined a "belt" zone in cities like St. Louis that roughly matched the 
functions of the frame. 27 The analysis justified land clearance in down-
town fringe areas to protect and enhance the core. 
Plans in Oakland and Baltimore were good summaries of the new views. 
A reviewer for the Journal of the American Institute of Planners called 
Baltimore's Plan for the Central Business District the "prototype of the 
comprehensive CBD plan." Increases in private and public offices par-
tially balanced the projected declines in retail, wholesale, and industrial 
uses. Downtown not only needed new facilities such as parking garages 
but also required much broader replanning of land uses to support a 
selected set of region-serving functions. The centerpiece for implementa-
tion was the Charles Center redevelopment project to remake the down-
town core. Oakland's Central District Plan in 1966 distinguished among a 
3 
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e inner ring, and peripheral ring, each of which called for a different cor, 
set of public interventions. 28 
Downtown as a Federation of Everyday Environments: 1965-75 
The massive land clearances of the 1950s fueled a reaction against urban 
renewal in the early 1960s from both the conservative and liberal sides of 
the political spectrum. The former emphasized the economic failures of 
urban renewal and its inability to improve on the private market in land 
and housing. The latter described its unwanted social impacts and the 
destruction of viable lower, income communities. 29 One of the perhaps 
unexpected side effects was the redefinition of downtown as a set of 
distinct functional subdistricts, each of which appeared to foster a differ, 
ent sort of activity and each of which needed particularized treatment. 
This new vision or image drew on the work of Herbert Gans, Jane 
Jacobs, and Kevin Lynch, all of whom suggested that downtowns had to 
be experienced on the relatively small scale of individual buildings, 
blocks, and districts. 3o The contrast between older and newer views can 
be read in a comparison of Gruen's 1955 plan for Fort Worth and his plan 
for Boston from the early 1960s. In the latter he identified a dozen and a 
half "pedestrial nuclei, each devoted to a variety of land uses, with an 
emphasis, however, on those which have developed historically." Seven 
of the nuclei were in the "so called CBD" and eleven just outside. 3i The 
transition can also be seen in a comparison of 1961 statements by Jacobs 
and Charles Abrams. Drawing their sense of the American city from New 
York, both Jacobs and Abrams hoped to achieve vibrant, active down, 
town districts. Abrams also reaffirmed the idea of downtown as a single 
unit, asserting that "a downtown area is a cohesive unit which lives or dies 
as a whole." Jacobs, in contrast, treated downtown as a set of intertwined 
activity centers. In the best,selling Death and Ufe of Great American Cities, 
she wrote about diversity, subdistricts, and concentrated "pools of use." 
"Every city primary use," she wrote, "needs its intimate matrix of 'profane' 
city to work to best advantage. The courts building in San Francisco 
needs one kind of matrix with its secondary diversity. The opera needs 
another kind. "32 
Academics participated in the new understanding of downtowns as 
multiple centers with behavioral studies of user subareas and efforts to 
define the social and economic geography of downtowns. Common prod, 
ucts of the 1960s were studies of retail clustering and the mapping of 
II 
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functional subdistricts for cities such as Dallas, New Orleans, and Chi-
cago. 33 University of Washington researchers found that downtown Seat-
tle was composed of "user subsystems" and activity nodes that should be 
delineated before the city undertook any new plans and projects. 34 Histori-
cal geographers such as David Ward and Martyn Bowden supplemented 
the current mapping efforts by studying the historical coalescence of down-
town out of a variety of functional subareas. 35 
It is clear that subarea analysis was in the air by the later 1960s. In 
1963, consultant Donald Monson had responded to the concerns of the 
Central Association of Seattle with a Comprehensive Plan for the Central 
Business District. Monson's proposal was Gruenesque, ignoring the con-
straints of the city's steep hills to propose a ring highway defining a 
unitary downtown, fringe parking garages, and pedestrianized shopping 
streets. Seven years later, the Central Association's own annual report 
stated that downtown Seattle was best understood in terms of a "system of 
functional zones, each with a distinct character that, when integrated 
into the whole, make up the central nervous system of our metropolitan 
community." Each of the six districts "has its own role to play and poten-
tial to fulfill" in the expected development of Seattle as a headquarters 
city.36 
Omaha's formal plans also displayed the changing policy orientations of 
the three postwar decades. As Janet Daly has shown, the "Omaha Plan" of 
1956 scarcely recognized downtown as a problem and emphasized infra-
structure investment. Ten years later, the Central Omaha Plan (1966) 
recognized special downtown needs but placed its faith in interstate high-
ways and urban renewal. The next seven years, however, brought a gen-
erational transition in civic leadership and a willingness to focus on the 
multiple experiences that downtown had to offer. A new central business 
district plan in 1973 divided downtown Omaha into eight "neighbor-
hoods" or functional areas. Planners hoped that a variety of functions and 
attractions would pull residents back downtown, and that each identifi-
able district would strengthen the others. 37 
The story was the same in Portland. Urban renewal planners in 1957-
60 envisioned a compact downtown defined by a freeway loop and periph-
eral parking lots. The local downtown business lobby supported the pro-
posals in the hope that property values could be stabilized in a small, 
limited-function business district. A decade later, a new generation of 
business leaders, politicians, and citizens redefined downtown Portland 
around the theme of variety. The citizen advisory committee that wrote 
the planning guidelines for the new Downtown Plan of 1972 divided the 
core into twenty-one districts on the basis of current uses, opportunities 
• 
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6 r redevelopment, and visual coherence. The plan inventoried current 
o es for each area and focused on possibilities for new housing, secondary 
:tail centers, pedestrian circulation, public transit, and waterfront open 
space. Previous plans for downtown Portland had offered bird's,eye views 
in which tiny automobiles coursed along looping highways between toy 
houses and skyscrapers. The 1972 plan depicted downtown Portland as a 
sequence of sidewalk scenes. Retired men played chess in the park, stu, 
dents munched junk food near Portland State University, shoppers 
strolled a transit mall, and children played around a new foundation. 38 
By the early 1970s, the subdistricted downtown was as much a staple of 
planning documents as the unitary downtown had been in 1950. Indeed, 
subarea analysis remained a standard for downtown description into the 
1990s. After 1975, however, it became accepted background rather than 
an exciting discovery. 39 A sampling of downtown plans from 1976 to 1986 
shows that Dallas and Atlanta each identified three districts. Dayton 
identified seven, Washington seven (or perhaps ten), Richmond eight, 
and Oakland eleven. Denver found six districts in its core and four more 
in a surrounding transition zone. Seattle built its downtown plan on 
eleven "areas of varied character. "40 
Downtown as a Set of Individual Experiences: 1975-85 
As American cities recovered from the severe real estate recession of 
1973-74, planners and policymakers reevaluated their discovery of the 
multiple downtown. Subdistrict analysis identified a wider range of devel, 
opment opportunities than a unitary analysis. At the same time, its recog, 
nition of residential groups and secondary business clusters built in a bias 
in favor of conservation and enhancement rather than redevelopment. 
The desire to stimulate downtown business and investment brought a 
renewed interest in downtowns as consciously manipulated artifacts. In 
this newest understanding, downtown was less a set of distinct social 
environments than a collection of opportunities for individual experi, 
ences. Downtown areas were increasingly seen as environments to be 
consciously designed in the interest of enjoyment and tourism. This con' 
ception of downtown as a theme park accepted its loss of primacy within 
the metropolitan community. It was to be reconstructed to serve tourists, 
conventioneers, and occasional visitors on safari from the suburbs. It also 
accepted that suburban "outer cities" were emerging as co,equals to down, 
town and then borrowed some of the ideas of the consciously designed 
suburban environment. If direct retail competition with suburban malls 
I 
! 
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was a failure, planners asked, why not emphasize specialized entertain-
ment and shopping. The results were downtowns conceived as museums, 
cultural centers, amenity districts, and amusement parks. 
An obvious reflection of the new understanding was a flood of interest 
in the academic and professional literature on the economic role of the 
arts and on the recovery of physical amenities, especially along water-
fronts. Books and articles on the arts as contributors to urban develop-
ment policy peaked in the early 1980s. 41 Beginning in the early 1970s, 
William H. Whyte examined the environmental determinants of individ-
ual responses to parks, plazas, sidewalks, and other downtown public 
spaces. He helped to popularize a view of downtown as a series of personal 
experiences and choices. 42 A number of educational programs and public-
interest lobbying groups with an interest in the promotion of enjoyable 
downtowns also emerged or expanded during the late 1970s and early 
1980s. Examples include the Main Street program of the National Trust 
for Historic Preservation, the Waterfront Center, and Partners for Livable 
Places. 
Although usually read as cultural criticism rather than policy analysis, 
Robert Venturi, Denise Scott Brown, and Stephen lzenour's manifesto, 
Learning from Las Vegas (1972), documents the same emerging understand-
ing of downtowns. The result of a Yale architecture seminar, the book 
defined Las Vegas as the populist alternative to the carefully ordered and 
centered city. The city's "downtown" is its commercial strip, a new main 
street of activity nodes that are connected by automobiles and announced 
by huge signs. The purpose of commercial Las Vegas is to present a series 
of surfaces. It is a city whose business district is explicitly designed as a 
sequence of fragmented and individualized experiences. 43 
In rejecting the necessity and value of a unitary downtown, Learningfrom 
Las Vegas was an early example of the postmodern tum in Western culture. 
Postmodernism emerged in art, architecture, and literature as a reaction 
against the austerity, universalism, or formalism of mid, twentieth, century 
culture. Given its name in the early 1970s, its emergence as a set of linked 
ideas or artistic preferences has been dated variously to the early 1960s by 
Fredric Jameson and Charles Jencks and to the 1970s by David Harvey. 
Jane Jacobs, Robert Venturi, and the advocacy planning movement have 
all earned a place as early examples of the political side of postmodernism, 
with its emphasis on popular culture and open pluralism. 44 The revaluation 
of subdistricts as primary to the functioning of downtowns clearly expressed 
the same ideas. 
Likewise, the elevation of downtown as a stage set in the mid,1970s fit 
with an increasing emphasis on the inherent value of the unexpected. 
., 
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The self,consciously theatrical design of the show,off buildings that char, 
erized postmodernism by the later 1970s depended on juxtaposition of 
actl jumbling of spaces, and playful use of historical allusion. City stY es, I . . I d h f' d' ters themse ves were mcreasmg y presente as open t eaters 0 m 1, ~~~ualism. Jonathan Raban's Soft City (1974), offered by David Harvey as 
ne of the first postmodern treatments of the city, depicted London as an 
~encyclopedia" or "emporium of styles." In Raban's version, living in the 
citY was an art in itself, making the physical setting a stage or canvas for 
its inhabitants. 45 In practical application, the new aesthetic meant down, 
town plans that emphasized design values and aimed for special attrac' 
tions to appeal to the maturing baby boomers who would soon find them, 
selves caricatured as "yuppies." 
Boston and Baltimore are easily identified as pioneers of the American 
downtown as artifact. In the later 1960s and early 1970s, efforts to pro' 
mote new downtown retail centers had produced some prominent failures 
as' well as profitable developments. Baltimore's Inner Harbor redevelop, 
ment program and Boston's initial efforts in the Fanueil Hall/Waterfront 
area dated to the same problematic years of the late 1960s. However, they 
bore fruit between 1976 and 1981 with attractive new open space and 
spectacularly successful retail complexes that were quickly dubbed "festi, 
val markets." Frieden and Sagalyn have documented more than one hun' 
dred comparable projects between 1970 and 1988, most of them since the 
late 1970s, when the Boston and Baltimore examples encouraged city 
governments to become active partners. 46 
Many of these festival market projects are open to Harvey's critical 
description of "an architecture of spectacle, with its sense of surface glitter 
and transitory participatory pleasure." A climax product of the species is 
Horton Plaza in San Diego, first planned in the 1970s and opened in 
1987. The "Plaza" is a contrived environment that draws visitors into a 
mildly but deliberately confusing shopping mall. The interior spaces offer 
multiple levels, bridges, passageways, and curving corridors. They are 
programmed with safely interesting activities. They are decked out in 
painful pseudo, Mediterranean pastels. They are explicitly presented as a 
"fun" alternative to the "gray" office towers of downtown San Diego. 47 
Festival markets were part of a long shopping list of amenity projects for 
the 1980s. Exhibition space in major convention cities doubled between 
1975 and 1990. Cities added performing arts centers, arts districts, water' 
front redevelopment, downtown open space, historic districts, rehabili, 
tated hotels, and museum/aquarium complexes. 48 San Antonio's roster of 
projects for the 1980s included the River Center festival market, an 
expanded convention center, a domed stadium, a restored theater, a new 
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art museum in an adapted historic building, a luxury hotel, and a transit 
mall. Most of the projects on the standard list aimed at the creation of 
low,end service jobs to replace the lost manufacturing and warehousing 
jobs that were no longer located on the downtown fringe. 
In formal planning, the emphasis shifted significantly to design control, 
preservation planning, fine,tuning of floor,area ratios, amenities bonuses, 
and similar approaches that treated downtowns as visual experiences. 
Federal allowance of accelerated depreciation for historic buildings in 
1976 and investment tax credits after 1981 encouraged a boom in the 
designation of buildings and downtown districts. The interest built on the 
earlier thematic understanding of downtown as a set of subareas. It took 
off when the designation of historic districts also appeared to meet the 
newly perceived need to turn downtown into a collection of stage sets.49 
Downtown planners by the early 1980s tended to see the task of down-
town planning as promoting and linking groups of experiences from which 
visitors could pick and choose. 50 New Orleans's Growth Management 
Program (1975) used historic districts and incentive zoning for pedestrian 
amenities. The innovative Time for Springfield [Massachusetts] plan of 
1978 emphasized recycling historical structures, open space, cultural facili-
ties, reclamation of the Connecticut riverfront, and aggressive program-
ming of public festivals. Chicago's 1981 Comprehensive Plan mentioned 
leisure,time activities first, cultural institutions second, offices third, and 
manufacturing last. A privately commissioned Central Area Plan (1984) 
envisioned central Chicago as a complementary mix of housing, retailing, 
tourism, cultural facilities, new offices, and old landmarks. Milwaukee's 
Downtown Goals and Policies (1985) stressed pedestrian linkages among 
hotels, a convention center, retailers, and cultural attractions; it placed 
design review and improved lakefront access near the top of implementa-
tion measures. Richmond's Downtown Plan (1984) similarly emphasized 
the need to maintain an attractive environment, to cluster amenities, to 
expand cultural activities, and to tie together the downtown subdistricts. 
It placed marketing, public relations, advertising, and special events on 
the same level with financial assistance and transportation in the imple-
mentation program. "A more alive Downtown," said the plan, "means 
more culture and leisure time offerings, special shopping opportunities 
and other uniquely urban qualities which add to the quality of life in 
Richmond. Bit by bit it all results in an improved national image, a better 
local identity, and an increased sense of pride in one's city. "51 
The new directions of aesthetic planning were anticipated in New 
York's extensive design overlay districts and reached a climax in the San 
Francisco Downtown Plan of 1985. New York first used special zoning 
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. . ts in 1968 to protect the special character of the Manhattan theater d~str~Ct By the early 1980s it had adopted thirty such districts to preserve 
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. values 52 San Francisco s heralded plan responded to a downtown design . 
development boom that doubled office space between 1965 and 1983. 
The 1985 document was pre~ented as a growth management plan, ~ut it 
b 'It on the city's Urban Deslgn Plan of 1971. Although the plan clalmed 
Ul
aim at maintaining San Francisco's predominance as a world commer, t~ I city, it gave nearly half its space to issues such as protecting solar 
Cia ss increasing open space, requiring the preservation of 271 historic 
acce , d . . . k l' h h d' . f buildings, an promotmg an mterestmg s y me t roug eSlgn revlew 0 
new buildings by a panel of experts. 53 
Downtown as Command Post: 1985-
Since the late nineteenth century, skyscrapers filled with executives and 
typists have been the essential symbol for downtowns. After spending the 
1970s arm and arm with pedestrians, by the mid, 1980s experts had redis, 
covered downtown's continuing importance as a transaction center. The 
recognition was triggered by the continued downtown building boom that 
ran from the mid,1970s to the end of the 1980s, dwarfing the earlier 
booms of the 1920s and the urban renewal era and bringing newspaper 
stories that headlined "U.S. Downtowns: No Longer Downtrodden. "54 In 
the thirty largest metropolitan areas, office construction in the first half of 
the 1980s ran at twice the rate of the 1970s, which had in turn outpaced 
the 1960s by 50 percent. 55 The boom hit more than New York, Boston, 
and Los Angeles. Less glamorous cities like Louisville added three million 
square feet of office space and Cleveland added six million. 56 
The office boom held out the hope that downtowns could tap into the 
global service economy at the high end of managerial, professional, 
finance, and consulting jobs as well as at the low end of entertainment 
and personal services. It substantially re,created an understanding of 
downtowns as unique centers. In this case, however, they were seen less 
as the unitary center of an individual metropolis than as centralized 
nodes of activity within national and global networks. This newest un' 
derstanding sees downtown as floating freely in global economic space, 
just as the high, rise office towers of Atlanta or Houston float above their 
surrounding parking fields with little connection to nearby neighbor, 
hoods. Indeed, the decision by the Department of Commerce that the 
1987 Census of Retailing would cease to report data for central business 
districts was an official declaration that general retailing for the metro' 
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politan market is no longer viewed as an important downtown function. 
Landscape critic J. B. Jackson agrees that the urban center has lost its 
role in daily life, transformed instead into "an impressive symbol of 
remote power and unattainable wealth." The downtown as command 
post is "dedicated to power and money and technology, not to tradi-
tional human activities or institutions. "57 
One academic response in the last decade has been a large literature on 
the restructuring of economic space within the globalized economy. Much 
of this literature is Marxist in approach, with downtowns as the most 
visible expressions of the structure of economic power. As John Fried-
mann and Goetz Wolff have put it, world cities are increasingly divided 
between worker "ghettoes" and capitalists in their office tower "cita-
dels. "58 Traditional geographers and economists explain the emergence of 
the high'rise downtown in terms of the continuing value of central loca-
tions for face,to,face contact and the quick exchange of sensitive or 
specialized information-what Gail Garfield Schwartz calls "off,the-
record information [which] cannot be transmitted on any way except in 
person. "59 Writers such as Richard Child Hill and Joe Feagin in the mid-
1980s analyzed the public policies that promote high, rise downtowns as 
the "corporate center" strategy. 60 
A second academic and professional response has been a new interest in 
the politics of real estate development and deal making. Paul Peterson's 
City Limits set a theme for the 1980s by arguing that economic develop-
ment is the primary and proper role for local government. Urban policy 
specialists have zeroed in on cases such as the North Loop project in 
Chicago as examples of the political complexities of contemporary devel-
opment. The downtown development case studies in the Urban Land 
Institute's Cities Reborn are matched by such university press books as 
Downtown, Inc. 61 The 1980s saw a new academic interest in real estate 
development curricula that span the interests of planning programs and 
business schools. Traditional regulatory planning is now matched by the 
newer subdiscipline of development planning, whose practitioners mobi-
lize public resources to encourage growth on a project,by,project basis. 61 
In formal planning, the 1980s brought a renewed attention to accommo-
dating the perceived needs for downtown growth, at least in the form of 
office space. Philadelphia's extensively analyzed downtown plan of 1988 is 
characterized as an "economic development plan" whose first goal is to 
"achieve significant economic growth" by developing the "enormous poten, 
tial" of the "office,based information and service economy. "63 New plans 
for Denver (1986) and Cleveland (1988) aim to reinforce downtowns as 
financial and administrative centers. The plans accept a vision of 
• 
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he growth of its mid,Manhattan business core westward to Seventh and 
~i hth avenues and beyond to the proposed Lincoln West project. 64 Spring' 
6eTd's Visions 1989 replaced the 1979 goal of enriching individual experi, 
ences with a strategy aimed at securing office expansion spilling over from 
Boston and New York. Planners in San Francisco, Portland, Seattle, and 
Chicago accepted the desirability of new office towers and debated whether 
to direct such growth upward through amenity bonuses and higher floor, 
area ratios or outward by rezoning and redeveloping the downtown frame. 65 
The operative question was not "whether" but "where." 
The emphasis on the networked downtown suggests the continued 
strength of the generalizing forces of modernization. The current idea of 
downtown as command post affirms the essential characteristics of 
modemism-abstraction, deracination, universalism. It calls for architec, 
ture and planning in which the function of information exchange over, 
rides complexities and variations in form. The rise of this newest interpre, 
tation implies that the postmodem themes of the 1970s and 1980s are 
ordinary turns in an ongoing discourse. Postmodernism as seen from down, 
town is part of a continuing dialogue rather than an epochal rewriting of a 
century,old understanding of urban development. 
The primary texts of downtown policy show that we think differently 
about cities now than we did in earlier decades. Not only do we know 
more and different things, but we fit this knowledge together around 
different understandings and assumptions that seem too obvious to articu, 
late. We already know to be careful in projecting economic and demo, 
graphic trends. We need to exercise the same caution about intellectual 
trends, for accepted preferences in planning ideas can change with nearly 
the speed of artistic or architectural fashion. New understandings are as 
likely to reject or ignore the recent past as to amplify its particular themes. 
Only by taking the historian's backward step can we see how far and how 
quickly those understandings have moved. 66 
An obvious lesson for policymakers is that our mutable understanding 
of downtown has built contradictions into its planning goals and physical 
fabric. Downtowns show an unresolved tension between the goals of the 
current and previous decades. At the street level, for example, they are 
structured as a grab bag of individual choices. Above the street they are 
utilized intensely by the corporate sector. The contemporary mixed,use 
development, with its lower, floor shops, restaurants, and theaters and 
upper, level offices, is a tangible manifestation of the tension. At the same 
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time, the office expansion agenda can clash directly with the earlier 
understanding of downtown as a coalition of subareas. Office develop. 
ment planning offers little place to districts that do not contribute to the 
explicit corporate center strategy. Given these contradictions, policymak. 
ers should not be surprised that the legitimation of subdistricts and the 
promotion of amenities created constituencies that may challenge the 
plans of the 1990s. Seattle is a case in point of popular resistance to plans 
with a tight focus on control functions. Many residents in the late 1980s 
came to view downtown development and the preservation of a down. 
town usable by average citizens as competing goals. In 1989 they voted a 
symbolic limit on downtown development when it appeared that the new 
Land Use and Transportation Plan for Downtown Seattle (1985) failed to 
protect either the appearance of downtown or the livability of close~in 
neighborhoods. 67 
The challenge in Seattle and other cities such as San Francisco suggest~ 
that planners and policymakers need to turn their attention to the charac. 
teristics that make downtown different from other nodes in the transac· 
tional grid. Whether we call them outer cities or outtowns or edge cities, 
peripheral office clusters can house many transactional functions as effec. 
tively as established downtowns. Nevertheless, downtown continues to 
offer the urban advantages of variety and intensity in ways not possible on 
the edge. Indeed, the one advantage of core over periphery is its social 
inclusiveness. Downtown is certainly a natural home for plugged~in execu· 
tives, but it can also be an effective setting for integrating old minorities, 
new minorities, and majority society. It remains the one part of the 
metropolis that most effectively generates new ideas by bringing together 
the greatest range of groups and individuals. The idea of a socially inclu· 
sive downtown could logically recombine the old idea of a unitary center 
with the mid~ 1960s vision of downtown as the home to distinct grouP! 
and communities. Such a reconstructed understanding of downtown a! 
everybody's neighborhood would also reaffirm the belief in cities as single 
metropolitan systems that offer comparable sets of opportunities to all 
their citizens. 
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